How Obama Lost His Influence in Egypt
The death toll is topping 600 in Cairo—and what can the administration do? The White House’s moves since the Arab Spring have weakened any leverage it might wield. By Josh Rogin.
The
Obama administration seems powerless in its effort to persuade the
Egyptian military to halt the violence against civilians that has
resulted in hundreds of deaths this week. The crisis lays bare the
diminished U.S. influence on the Egyptian military compared to only two
years ago.
In
2011, President Obama and the Egyptian military appeared to be on the
same page. In response to calls not to fire on demonstrators against
Hosni Mubarak, the military actually protected the protesters and Obama
was able to help usher in the Arab Spring by urging the Egyptian
strongman to step down. In 2013, Egypt’s military has ignored every
recommendation from the White House and the administration is either
unwilling or unable to use what little leverage America has left to
pressure Egypt’s interim government to abide by U.S. and international
requests.
While
Egypt was a close ally of the U.S. for decades until the 2011
revolution, over the past two years the Obama administration has seen
its influence there dwindling for a variety of reasons, according to
experts and observers. The internal politics in Egypt have become more
nationalistic and virulently anti-American. The Obama administration has
had a timid, reactive, and somewhat-incoherent policy that has
alienated all sides and sacrificed opportunities to use limited American
leverage. Meanwhile, other regional actors have stepped into the void
to play a larger role.
“The
United States strongly condemns the steps that have been taken by
Egypt’s interim government and security forces,” Obama said Thursday in
his first public remarks on the violence that continues to roil several
Egyptian cities. “While we want to sustain our relationship with Egypt,
our traditional cooperation cannot continue as usual when civilians are
being killed in the streets and rights are being rolled back.”
Obama
announced that the U.S. was canceling Bright Star, the joint military
exercises planned for next month, but didn’t say anything about the $1.3
billion in military aid the U.S. gives the Egyptian military each year.
It remains to be seen if the Egyptian government will respond to
Obama’s missive; they haven’t acquiesced to the administration’s demands
thus far.
In
late June, even before the Egyptian military deposed and arrested
President Mohamed Morsi, top U.S. officials urged the military against
the move. Since the military takeover, the administration has been
urging the military-led interim government to refrain from arresting
Muslim Brotherhood leaders, avoid instituting martial law, allow for
peaceful protests, and reach out to Islamists. All of those requests
have been ignored.
Many
in Washington say the Obama administration’s relative impotence this
time around is due to a refusal to really put pressure on the Egyptian
military and government.
“In
2011, the administration told the military clearly that if you kill
hundreds of people in Tahrir Square, then our relationship will be
severely damaged. This time they didn’t do that,” said Stephen
McInerney, executive director of the Project on Middle East Democracy.
“This administration is extremely reluctant to use pressure against its
allies. Then when they try to do so, it’s too little, too late, and less
effective.”
Most
experts were expecting Obama to at least suspend military aid for the
duration of the violence and were disappointed that the administration
still won’t use the funding as pressure, even though suspending payments
might not be enough to change the Egyptian military’s behavior.
Obama
noted Thursday that both sides in the conflict blame the U.S., a
popular and expedient political tactic in Egypt. But the Obama
administration fed that sentiment by instituting an Egypt policy since
2011 that alienated key actors and failed to use U.S. leverage at key
moments that led up to the current conflict, McInerney said.
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait have given the new government $13 billion since the takeover, more than 10 times the U.S. military aid.
“They
were too deferential to the Morsi government and also to the Egyptian
military and failed to build constructive relationships with all sorts
of other actors inside Egypt,” he said. “And now they are desperately
clinging to their relationship with the military, which is hanging by a
thread, because they don’t have any other allies.”
Meanwhile,
the Egyptian military has good reason to believe it can defy the Obama
administration’s wishes with little to no consequences. After they
deposed Morsi, the State Department declared they would not make a
judgment as to whether it was a coup, allowing the U.S. government to
avoid triggering a law that would have mandated a cutoff of military
aid.
“That
taught the Egyptian military that we need them more than they need us
and that we will not even enforce our own law,” said Elliott Abrams, who
served as deputy national security adviser to President George W. Bush
focusing on Middle East issues.
To
be sure, Egypt became much more complicated politically between 2011
and 2013, with the emergence of new political organizations that could
not have operated in the Mubarak era. Also, the 2011 revolution evoked a
new Egyptian nationalism that eschewed foreign influence of all types.
“One
of the themes of the uprising that has carried over from 2011 to 2013
was the notion of national power and dignity, and it was very important
for politicians to be perceived as not being in bed with the U.S.,” said
Steven Cook, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Also,
the stakes were so high that no external powers would be able to
influence both sides.”
But
during key moments over the past two years, including when the Egyptian
government arrested and then later convicted American NGO workers of
felony crimes, the administration avoided direct confrontation with the
Egyptians, rather than taking a tougher albeit riskier stance.
“We allegedly have influence but we never used the lever of the influence; so as a result we don’t have any,” Cook said.
Meanwhile,
other regional actors have come in to fill the void left by a lack of
U.S. leadership, building alliances to support both sides. Saudi Arabia,
the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait have given the new government $13
billion since the takeover, more than 10 times the U.S. military aid.
Turkey and Qatar have come to the defense of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The
U.S. government has important relationships with all of these countries
and is not eager to choose a side, said Brian Katulis, senior fellow at
the Center for American Progress. The tentative and cautious nature of
the U.S. policy in Egypt is just one example of an administration
approach to the Arab Spring that has been reactive and somewhat ad hoc,
he said.
“This
is an administration that constantly hedges its bets in a region that’s
increasingly fractured. It’s in their DNA in the way they conduct
foreign policy,” he said.
Overall,
the Obama administration needs to maintain a good relationship with
whoever is running Egypt for security reasons and recognizes that
diminished U.S. influence there is the new reality.
“Leverage is like your muscles,” Katulis said. “If you don’t exercise them every once in a while, you lose them.”
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